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The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined for a Public World, by Jennifer E. 
Rothman 
Abstract 
In The Right of Publicity, Professor Jennifer E. Rothman of Loyola Law School offers an in-depth 
genealogy of the right of publicity, while navigating through scholarly narratives surrounding its origin. The 
book contests the current body of literature, which situates the origin of the right of publicity in privacy 
law. Instead of conceptualizing the right of publicity as another form of intellectual property right, the 
work traces the right of publicity law to (re-) articulate it as a personal right. Stemming from the author’s 
expertise in intellectual property law and the right of publicity, this book challenges readers to consider 
the implications of interpreting the right of publicity as a transferrable property right. The author 
masterfully parses through and critiques the current understandings of the right of publicity to offer an 
alternative model to be implemented in publicity law. 









The Right of Publicity: Privacy Reimagined 
for a Public World, by Jennifer E. 
Rothman1 
ALEXIS EUN YOUNG CHOI2 
In The Right of Publicity, Professor Jennifer E. Rothman of Loyola Law School offers an 
in-depth genealogy of the right of publicity, while navigating through scholarly narratives 
surrounding its origin. The book contests the current body of literature, which situates the 
origin of the right of publicity in privacy law. Instead of conceptualizing the right of publicity as 
another form of intellectual property right, the work traces the right of publicity law to (re-) 
articulate it as a personal right. Stemming from the author’s expertise in intellectual property 
law and the right of publicity, this book challenges readers to consider the implications of 
interpreting the right of publicity as a transferrable property right. The author masterfully 
parses through and critiques the current understandings of the right of publicity to offer an 
alternative model to be implemented in publicity law. 
THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY ofers an in-depth genealogy of the right of publicity, 
while navigating through historical and current scholarly narratives surrounding 
its origins. Written by Jennifer E. Rothman, Professor of Law at Loyola Law School, 
the book successfully revises the history of rights of publicity. It contributes to the 
current body of literature, which recognizes the origin of the right of publicity in 
privacy law.3 Instead of conceptualizing the right of publicity as another form of 
1. (Harvard University Press, 2018). 
2. JD Candidate 2020, Osgoode Hall Law School. 
3. See generally Daniel Nemet-Nejat, “Hey, Tat’s My Persona!: Exploring the Right of 
Publicity for Blogs and Online Social Networks” (2009) 33 Colum J L & Arts 113; Andrew 
Beckerman-Rodau, “Toward a Limited Right of Publicity: An Argument for the Convergence 
of the Right of Publicity, Unfair Competition, and Trademark Law” (2013) 23 Fordham IP 
Media & Ent LJ 132; Ashley Messenger, “Rethinking the Right of Publicity in the Context 
of Social Media” (2018) 24 Widener L Rev 259. 








intellectual property right, the work traces the right of publicity law in order to 
articulate it as a personal right. Embodying the author’s expertise in intellectual 
property law, this book challenges us to consider the implications of interpreting 
the right of publicity as a transferrable property right. Rothman’s main objective 
is to parse through and to critique the current understandings of the right of 
publicity. Te author then ofers an alternative model that can be implemented 
in publicity law. 
Rothman carefully re-builds the creation story of the right of publicity over 
three parts and eight chapters. Te frst two parts cover the historical background 
of publicity law. In part one, entitled “Te Big Bang,” Rothman credits the rise 
of technology and advertisements in the late 1800s as giving birth to the right of 
privacy cases, with claims based on the “right to be let alone.”4 Her analysis notes 
the biases of the courts towards recognizing economic losses instead of emotional 
damages in privacy claims. Te author then contests the convention that the 
Haelan Labratories v Topps Chewing Gum5 case frst coined the term “right of 
publicity” and argues against the divergence between the right of privacy and the 
right of publicity. By challenging the well-accepted notion of Haelan Labratories 
as the genesis of the right of publicity in legal scholarship, Rothman uncovers 
the fctitiousness of this bifurcation between the right of privacy and the right 
of publicity. She critically traces case law that is often cited as highlighting the 
diference between publicity law and privacy law. Te book criticizes the common 
understanding that the “new” invention of the right of publicity expanded legal 
protection to include public fgures’ claims based on economic harms from their 
identities being commercialized without consent. Instead, the author asserts that 
privacy and publicity law, in reality, functioned in the same way. 
Part two continues to build a diferent chronology by placing the beginning 
of the right of publicity in the 1970s, instead of the 1950s as the majority of legal 
scholarship on the right of publicity tends to do.6 However, Rothman is not the 
only one who deviates from the commonly accepted history; other scholars have 
4. Rothman, supra note 1 at 5. 
5. 202 F (2d) 866, 868 (2d Cir 1953) [Haelan Labratories]. 
6. See generally Joseph R Gordin, “Te Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation” (1953) 62 
Yale LJ 1123; S Michael Kernan, “Privacy in Social Media: Te Right of Publicity” (2012) 
34 Hastings Comm & Ent LJ 363; Stephanie J Beach, “Fact & Fiction: Amending Right of 
Publicity Statutes to Include Life Story and Fictional Character Rights” (2017) 42 Seton Hall 
Legis J 131; Marshall Leafer, “Te Right of Publicity: A Comparative Perspective” (2007) 
70 Alb L Rev 1357; Francesca M Montalvo, “Refashioning the Right of Publicity: Protecting 
the Right to Use Your Name After Selling a Personal Name Trademark” (2013) 31 Cardozo 
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ofered alternative timelines, which do not designate the beginning of the right 
of publicity in the 1950s.7 Notably, Rothman’s account of the right of publicity 
is particularly illuminating, because it departs from employing the right of 
publicity as an independent property right similar to intellectual property rights, 
such as patent and copyright laws. For instance, her exploration of the concept 
of a post-mortem right of publicity—dead people having independent property 
rights to their names—is illustrated through her close review of foundational 
cases, such as Zacchini v Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.8 Tis exploration of 
why the right of publicity came to be conceptualized as a transferable property 
right is nuanced and insightful. However, chapter four unexpectedly includes the 
author’s speculations on why certain works had such infuence on the narrative 
of the right of publicity in the way that they did. For example, Rothman 
hypothesizes that Melville B. Nimmer, who wrote one of the well-known articles 
that argued for the transferable right of publicity,9 was most likely motivated 
in writing about the right of publicity by his interest in pursuing his academic 
career. Despite these brief out-of-place musings, the chapter maintains its focus 
on helping the reader understand the inconsistencies between US states, in the 
ways in which the right of publicity is conceptualized, through case studies. Tis 
analysis aptly reveals the difculty for both courts and lawyers to confdently 
defne the boundaries of the right of publicity. Part two concludes with a crucial 
review of the justifcations for the right of publicity, which is foundational to 
Rothman’s alternative conceptualization of the right of publicity. Tis continues 
to build on the theme of articulating the scope and the purpose of the right of 
publicity as a personal right of the everyday person. 
Rothman then shifts into critically examining and arguing against the 
transferability of the right of publicity, by reviewing the implications of 
voluntary and involuntary transfers of the publicity right. She asserts that 
this misconceptualization of the right of publicity, as a transferable property 
right, allows others (who she terms the “publicity-holder” as opposed to the 
“identity-holder”) to have control over someone’s identity.10 Importantly, she 
expands this control over personal identity to include control over the person his 
or herself, which further creates undue restrictions on the identity-holder’s “right 
7. See generally Eric E Johnson, “Disentangling the Right of Publicity” (2017) 111 Nw UL Rev 
891; Wee Jin Yeo, “Disciplining the Right of Publicity’s Nebulous First Amendment Defense 
with Teachings from Trademark Law” (2016) 34 Cardozo Arts & Ent LJ 401. 
8. 433 US 562 (1977). 
9. “Te Right of Publicity” (1954) 19 L & Contemp Probs 203. 
10. See Rothman, supra note 1 at 126. 











to liberty, freedom of speech, and freedom of association.”11 Rothman emphasizes 
that the right of publicity should not be disentangled from the identity holder 
and supports that the right of publicity should be “viewed as a fundamental 
right” which is inalienable.12 Te overarching argument against transferring 
the publicity right from the identity-holder gains momentum and the chapter 
concludes with the author’s call for legislative action to limit transferability and 
for the courts to ensure that the rights remain personal to the identity-holder. 
In the last part, “Dark Matter,” Rothman fully lays out her criticisms against 
articulating the right of publicity through transferability. She states that the right 
of publicity “encompasses rights far beyond the mere collection of income and 
entitlement to the economic value that fows from uses of a person’s identity.”13 
She reminds readers that the “dignitary and liberty-based justifcation are central 
to the [publicity] right’s existence”14 and further broadens the scope and the 
use of the right of publicity. Again, she prescribes a legislative remedy to limit 
transferability of one’s publicity right and to make explicit the rights as personal 
to the identity-holder.15 Contributing to the wider scholarly conversation 
surrounding the right of publicity, the chapter on the First Amendment teases 
out the book’s reasoning against placing the right of publicity in the intellectual 
property rights category. Rothman further confronts the ways in which the 
United States Supreme Court has favoured copyright holders in right of publicity 
cases and weaves in her commentary on the sites of confict between intellectual 
property and constitutional rights. Connecting back to the earlier investigation 
regarding the right of publicity for public fgures and celebrities, chapter seven 
critiques this legal distinction in the application of publicity law. Although the 
notion of extending the right of publicity to non-public fgures beyond celebrities 
is shared by others, this conclusion is often rooted in recognizing the commercial 
value of one’s identity and not necessarily in the liberty-based justifcation.16 
Furthermore, Rothman does not simply leave the argument there, but builds on 
it by ofering solutions to dealing with cases where the right of publicity and free 
speech appears to be in opposition. 
Te epilogue, “Te Big Crunch,” suggests a re-formation of the right of 
publicity universe; this prescriptive model of how the right of publicity should 
11. Ibid at 128. 
12. Ibid at 129. 
13. Ibid at 126. 
14. Ibid at 127. 
15. Ibid at 137. 
16. See e.g. Andrew T Coyle, “Finding a Better Analogy for the Right of Publicity” (2012) 77 










CHOI, THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY 283 
be understood is one of the strengths of this book. Rothman does not cut 
the analysis short with her comprehensive and critical review of the right of 
publicity and its historical manifestations, but instead ofers a well-articulated 
reconceptualization of the right of publicity. Te author outlines detailed ways 
in which the courts can deal with the right of publicity cases and contemplates 
how the alternative model may function in the context of our current world of 
social media. Te use of social media and its platforms poses a unique question 
for Rothman, as it is our right of publicity, our control over our own identities, 
and by extension, our liberty, that is at stake. Notably, it is unclear what issues 
will arise when these suggestions are implemented and the book does not delve 
too deeply into this. In fairness, many theoretical proposals often cannot predict 
with surgical precision how the model will manifest and what issues will arise 
in real life. Despite this uncertainty, which aficts many theoretical proposals, 
Rothman’s book is a valuable attempt in setting out the scope of the publicity 
right in our current legal and scholarly terrain. 
Although the right of publicity manifests diferently in Canada as privacy 
legislation and the tort of appropriation of personality, Rothman’s re-imagining of 
the right of publicity may be helpful in comparing the diferences among Canadian 
provinces and between the United States and Canada. In addition to Quebec, 
which is Canada’s sole civil law jurisdiction, four of the common law provinces 
in Canada, British Columbia, Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Saskatchewan,17 
have privacy legislation that provide a cause of action against unauthorized 
appropriation of personality.18 Te tort of appropriation of personality is the 
“unauthorized use of an individual’s persona … includ[ing] a person’s physical 
appearance (portrayed in a photograph or other visual representation), name, 
or voice.”19 Even among these provinces, there are diferences in how the 
tort of appropriation of personality is dealt with in statute. Unlike the other 
aforementioned provinces, the Privacy Acts of British Columbia, Newfoundland, 
and Saskatchewan explicitly state that the right of action for appropriation of 
personality is extinguished upon death.20 Ontario has a common law tort of 
appropriation of personality. Interestingly, this means that protecting privacy 
interests under the principles of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 
may be considered in the Canadian “right of publicity” cases. Despite the diverse 
17. See Amy M Conroy, “Protecting Your Personality Rights in Canada: A Matter of Property or 
Privacy?” (2012) 1 Western J Leg Stud 1. 
18. Ibid at 1. 
19. Ibid. 
20. Ibid at 6. 




approaches to the “right of publicity” in Canada, Rothman’s engagement with 
right of publicity issues is invaluable, as there are many commonalities between 
US jurisprudence and Canadian appropriation of personality cases.21 It is also 
insightful to consider what the author’s proposal of expanding the right of 
publicity as a fundamental right may look like by observing the common law 
tort of appropriation of personality cases in Ontario. 
In conclusion, Te Right of Publicity ofers a comprehensive review of the 
clashing histories of the right of publicity, including a survey of relevant cases 
paired with social artefacts of our cultural history. Te use of memorabilia and 
cultural references gives texture to the author’s narrative of the right of publicity. 
Rothman’s success in making this book accessible to readers, particularly to those 
who are not familiar with the right of publicity or privacy law, is due to her use 
of historical and modern case studies that attempt to untangle the histories of 
the right of publicity. Tis opens up the book to the general public who may 
be interested in this topic. More importantly, Rothman not only challenges the 
existing defnitions of the rights of publicity, but also proposes an alternative 
model of how it should be applied in a coherent and logical style. It is a daunting 
feat to take on the challenge of parsing through current narratives, which are 
taken for granted by both legal scholarship and the courts, to create something 
new. However, Te Right of Publicity thoughtfully considers the past, present, and 
future of the right of publicity. Rothman’s alternative creation story of the right 
of publicity universe is done in a digestible and accessible way, even for readers 
who are not familiar with this right and its complex entanglements with privacy 
and intellectual property law. 
21. See Robert G Howell, “Publicity Rights in the Common Law Provinces of Canada” (1998) 
18 Loy LA Ent LR 487. 
